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Abstract
Decision under risk and uncertainty has been attracting attention in neuroeconomics and 
neuroendocrinology of decision-making. This paper demonstrated that the 
neurotransmitter receptor theory-based value (utility) function can account for human 
and animal risk-taking behavior. The theory predicts that (i) when dopaminergic
neuronal response is efficiently coupled to the formation of ligand-receptor complex, 
subjects are risk-aversive (irrespective of their satisfaction level) and (ii) when the 
coupling is inefficient, subjects are risk-seeking at low satisfaction levels, consistent 
with risk-sensitive foraging theory in ecology. It is further suggested that some 
anomalies in decision under risk are due to inefficiency of the coupling between 
dopamine receptor activation and neuronal response. Future directions in the application 
of the model to studies in neuroeconomics of addiction and neuroendocrine modulation 
of risk-taking behavior are discussed.
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Introduction
Decision under risk and uncertainty has been a major topic in microeconomics, 
behavioral neuroeconomics, neurofinance, and econophysics [1-11]. Studies in 
behavioral and neuro- economics have revealed that humans and non-human animals 
discount the value of probabilistic rewards as the receipt becomes more uncertain [4-11]. 
In standard microeconomic theory, the expected utility theory has often been utilized to 
parametrize a subject's tendency to avoid uncertainty/risk (i.e., a variance of reward 
magnitudes) [1,12]. When a subjective value of an uncertain reward is smaller and 
larger than that of its statistical expected value, this tendency is referred to as 
risk-aversion and risk-preference, respectively. When her subjective value of the 
uncertain reward is equal to that of its statistical expected value, she is risk neutral. In 
this framework, the concavity (curvature) of the “utility” (i.e., subjective value of 
reward) as a function of reward size indicates subject's risk aversion.
The important and unresolved question has been what constitutes the 
reasonable assumption regarding the functional form of the utility function which 
determines the curvature of the utility as a function of a reward size and associated risk 
attitudes (i.e., either risk aversion, risk neutrality, or risk preference). The prospect 
theory proposed that the risk attitude (determined by the concavity of the value
function) differs between gain and loss domains, based on psychological consideration 
[4]. Specifically, people are risk aversive when they expect gains (preferring certain 
gains over uncertain gains with equal expected values); while risk seeking (preferring
uncertain losses over certain losses with equal statistical expected values) when they 
expect losses (referred to as a "framing effect") [4].
More recently, the nascent field of neuroeconomics has started to examine the 
neural basis of risk attitudes in decision-making under uncertainty [13,14]. Several 
types of brain lesion patients and substance misusers have been reported to have low 
degrees of risk aversion or even risk preference in financial decision-making [8,9]. In 
addition, neuroeconomic studies try to elucidate neurocomputational processes 
underlying expected utility-maximization, which are important for a better 
understanding of biophysical mechanisms of valuation [13]. A recent study in this line 
has proposed that the shape/functional form of the utility/value function may be 
determined by biophysical constraints on a relationship between neurotransmitter 
concentrations and neuronal response in reward processing neural circuits [15]. The 
theoretical study states that biophysical relationship derived from 
neurotransmitter-receptor occupancy theory may account for the shape of the 
utility/value function; and dopamine receptors in reward-processing brain regions may 
play an important role as a number of cognitive and behavioral neurobiological studies 
have reported [14,16]. However, to date, no study has proceeded to analyze the
theoretical implications of the receptor occupancy theory-based value function model, 
especially on risk attitudes which are important for neuroeconomics and biophysical 
basis of economic decision-making under uncertainty. I therefore examined, in the 
present study, risk aversion parameters (i.e., relative and absolute risk aversion) [2,3,12]
derived from the neuro-biophysical model based on well-established receptor 
occupancy theory. The model demonstrated that biophysical properties of neuronal cells 
are directly relevant to the risk attitude parameters.
Receptor occupancy theory and utility function
Neurobiological studies have revealed that biological processing underlying 
valuation is mediated in brain regions such as the striatum, the neucleus accumbens, and 
the orbitofrontal cortex [13]. In addition to these functional brain mapping studies, it is 
important to investigate more microscopic neurobiophysical processes, in order to 
establish decision theory in neuroeconomics based on “hard sciences” such as 
biophysics and biochemistry. A recent study [15] by neuroeconomists Berns, Capra, and 
Noussair (BCN) has made a significant advance in this direction, although the study did 
not examine the characteristics of risk attitudes implied by the BCN model.
Neurobiological studies have established that reinforcers/rewards (such as 
money, foods, and addictive substances) induce the releases of neurotransmitter (e.g., 
dopamine) from presynaptic neurons. Then, postsynaptic neurons will be activated by 
the binding of the neurotransmitters (i.e., ligands) to their receptors on the cell 
membrane of the postsynaptic neurons. The BCN theory proposed that valuation (or 
neurocomputation of the “utility function”) is closely associated with the degree of the 
neuronal cell response to a reinforcer/reward-induced neurotransmitter release from the 
presynaptic neuron. More specifically, the relationship between neurotransmitter 
elevation induced by reinforcers and the degree of neuronal cell activation in response 
to the elevation of the neurotransmitter may determine the shape of the utility function.
Biophysical and biochemical studies on ligand-receptor interactions have 
established the receptor occupancy theory [17], which is based on the law of mass 
action in biophysical chemistry. According to the receptor occupancy theory, the 
magnitude of the cell response is expressed as:
         [cell response] = (CRmax[A]/(kd+[A])
a
where [A] is the concentration of the released neurotransmitter from the presynaptic 
neurons, CRmax is the maximum of cell response, and 0<kd<1 is the dissociation constant 
of the binding of the neurotransmitter (ligand) to its receptor, and a is an exponent 
determined by the efficienty of coupling between the ligand-receptor complex formation 
(biochemical stimulus to the cell) and the resulting cell response (0<a<1: efficient 
coupling, a=1: linear coupling, a>1: inefficient coupling). The BCN theory has made an 
approximation that [A] is proportional to the magnitude of an exogenous
reinforcer/reward z and the cell response determines the neurobiological valuation 
function (equivalent to the “utility funtion” in economics) U(z):
U(z) = [Rmax z/(k+ z)]
a                         (Equation 1)
where Rmax is the maximum of subjective value assigned to the reward/reinforcer and k 
is an effective dissociation constant and parameter a again corresponds to the efficiency 
of cell response to the formation of ligand-receptor complex. In this way, the BCN 
model has succeeded in explaining the existence of the upper limit (Rmax) of biological 
valuation, implying that the utility function in economics is equivalent to this BCN 
value function U(z).
It is important to note that “risk” corresponds to a variance of reward 
magnitudes. Suppose the choice problem example: choose between (A) $10 gain for 
sure and (B) $20 with probability of 0.5. Risk-aversive subjects prefer (A) to (B), 
risk-seeking subjects prefer (B) to (A), and risk-neutral subjects are indifferent.
According to the expected utility theory based on the BCN model, the subjective value 
of (A) and (B) are UA:=U($10) and UB:=U($20)/2, respectively. If U(z) is linear, UA =
UB (risk-neutral), but if U(z) is concave (i.e., U’’(z)<0) and convex (i.e., U’’(z)>0) in z, 
UA > UB  (risk-aversive) and UA <UB (risk-seeking).
Let us briefly see here the mathematical characteristics of the BCN value 
function. The first and second partial derivatives of the BCN value function in terms of 
z are:
∂U(z)/∂z = a k [Rmax/(k+z)]a/[z(k+z)] >0 (for a, z, and k >0),
and
∂2U(z)/∂z2 =  [2akz+a(1-a)k2][Rmax z/(k+z)]a/[z2(z2+2kz+k2)].
Therefore, the BCN value function is an increasing function of the reward magnitude 
(wealth/satisfaction) z, and the curvature U’’(z) of the BCN value function depends on 
parameters a, k, z, and Rmax. We can also see that the BCN value function approaches to 
(but not exceed) Rmax when z approaches infinity. It can be said that the BCN value 
function is capable of capturing the characteristics of human valuation, i.e., the 
existence of the upper limit of subjective value (saturation of satisfaction) and the larger 
amounts of reward tend to yield higher levels of satisfaction, although an increment in 
satisfaction from a unit of wealth/reward decreases with the level of the wealth (this 
corresponds to a “marginally diminishing” utility function in microeconomics).
However, no study to date examined the risk aversion parameters in the BCN 
value function, although the risk attitudes (which are determined by the shape of the 
utility function) play pivotal roles in behavioral ecology (especially in risk-sensitive 
foraging theory), economics and finance. To see the roles of risk attitude parameters in 
economic theory, I briefly introduce the absolute and relative risk aversion parameters 
in the next section.
Absolute and relative risk-attitudes in decision under uncertainty
In von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility theory (which has mainly 
adopted in microeconomics and game theory in both biology and economics), subjects 
are assumed to maximize the expected value of the summed utility of uncertain rewards: 
U(x1,p1;…;xi,pi;…;xn,pn)=ipiU(xi) (pi is the probability of obtaining an uncertain 
reward xi). In this theory, risk attitudes are defined in terms of concavity (curvature) of 
the utility function in terms of xi. More specifically, more concave and convex utility 
functions indicate higher degrees of risk aversion and preference, respectively. A linear 
utility function corresponds to risk-neutrality (neither risk aversion nor preference). In 
order to quantify subject’s risk-attitude, economists Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt [2,3] 
defined the following two parameters:
RA:= U''(z)/U'(z)                              (Equation 2)
RR:= zU''(z)/U'(z)                              (Equation 3)
where RA is the absolute risk aversion, and RR is the relative risk aversion (i.e., 
risk-aversion in relation to the level of one’s “wealth” z). Note that U(z) is the utility as 
a function of one’s wealth (reward size) z. It is important to note that RA is proportional
to the risk premium in microeconomics (i.e., the minimum difference between [the 
expected value of an uncertain reward that a person is willing to take] and [the certain 
value that s/he is indifferent to]) [12]. Absolute risk attitudes of the agent at the wealth 
level z can be classified as follows: absolute risk-aversion corresponds to RA >0,
absolute risk-preference corresponds to RA <0 (i.e., absolute risk aversion is negative), 
and absolute risk-neutrality indicates RA =0. We can also define relative risk attitudes
according to the signs of RR, in a similar manner. 
We can further classify the dependencies of absolute and relative risk attitudes 
on z. This consideration is important for predicting whether the poor or the rich tend to 
take risks. If ∂RA/∂z>0, the agent has increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA), if 
∂RA/∂z=0, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), and if ∂RA/∂z<0, decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA). Similarly, we can define: increasing relative risk 
aversion (IRRA), constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), and decreasing relative risk 
aversion (DRRA), according to the sign of the partial derivatives of RR in terms of z.
Arrow (1971) hypothesized that most subjects may be characterized by DARA 
and IRRA [3]. DARA indicates that people tend to increase the proportion of risky 
wealth (i.e., greater preference for betting) as their total wealth increases. IRRA implies 
if both wealth and size of bet are increased in the same proportion, the preference for 
betting should decrease. However to date, no study examined the biophysical 
constraints on risk attitudes imposed by the biophysical characteristics of neuronal cells 
for reward-processing (e.g. dopamine neurons). Furthermore, contrary to the Arrow's 
hypothesis on absolute risk aversion, several studies in biology (e.g., behavioral ecology 
and psychopharmacology) reported that subjects tend to be risk-seeking when the 
amount of their wealth (or the blood level of addictive substances such as heroin) is low
[18,19], indicating the discrepancy between the standard economic theory and 
human/animal behavior. The examinations of this discrepancy are important for 
establishing biophysical basis of economic decision-making, and more effective medical 
treatments for reducing risky behaviors observed in addicts to dopaminergic drugs such 
as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, because chronic (or even acute) intake of 
these dopaminergic drugs induce severe neuroadaptation in dopaminergic neurons [20].
Risk aversion parameters in neurotransmitter receptor occupancy model
As suggested above, it is important to examine the properties of risk attitude 
parameters in the BCN model. By direct calculations of the risk aversion parameters
defined above (equation 2 and 3), we obtain the following expression of the absolute 
and relative risk aversion parameters:
RA= [2z + (1-a)k]/[z
2 + kz]                             (Equation 4)
RR= [2z + (1-a)k]/[z + k].                              (Equation 5)
We see that the risk aversion parameters are independent of Rmax, indicating that risk 
aversion predicted from the receptor occupancy theory (BCN model) is not influenced 
by the maximal neuronal response Rmax; i.e., the maximal magnitude of subjective value 
which can be obtained from the reward (e.g., money, drugs). Furthermore, risk attitudes 
at sufficiently high levels of reward do not depend on parameters a and k, because when 
z → ∞, RA approaches to 0 (in other words, sufficiently wealthy subjects may not have 
absolute risk-aversion) and RR approaches to 2.
Next, in order to see how an increase in wealth/reward size changes the 
subject’s risk attitude, let us examine the dependency of the risk attitude parameters on z. 
There are three cases for the dependencies of risk attitudes on the magnitude of wealth z, 
according to the efficiency of coupling (parameter a) between stimulus to the cell (i.e., 
formation of a ligand-receptor complex) and neuronal response; namely, a<1 (efficient 
coupling), a=1 (linear coupling), and a>1 (inefficient coupling). In order to know 
whether the risk attitude parameters are increasing or decreasing functions of z, we need 
to calculate the derivatives of absolute and relative risk aversions in terms of z:
∂RA/∂z=  [2z2+2(1-a)kz+(1-a)k2]/[z2(z2+2kz+k2)]         (Equation 6)
∂RR/∂z= (1+a)k/[z2+2kz+k2].                           (Equation 7)
For relative risk aversion, it can readily be seen that, as Arrow has originally proposed,
a subject has IRRA irrespective of the efficiency of the coupling; namely, ∂RR/∂z>0 for 
any a(>0). In other words, a subject with larger reward sizes may less prefer gambling if 
both wealth and size of bet are increased in the same proportion, irrespective of the 
efficiency of dopaminergic neural response.
The dependency of absolute risk aversion on the reward z is more complicated. 
After mathematical examinations, we can reach the following conclusions (see 
Appendix for a detailed analytical procedure): (i) a subject has IRRA for any 
non-negative a, and (ii) a subject has DARA for a≤1, and for [z<zi and a>1]. It is 
important to note that a subject with inefficient coupling (i.e., a>1) has IARA for z
smaller than zi (see Appendix for an analytical expression of zi); in other words, s/he is 
less absolute risk-aversive when s/he has smaller amount of wealth z (<zi). This is not 
expected from Arrow's hypothesis, but consistent with the risk-sensitive foraging 
theory’s prediction and empirical observations in heroin addicts [19].
Regarding the sign of RA and RR, for [a>1 and z<zn] (see Appendix for an 
explicit expression of zn), a subject is absolute and relative risk-seeking (i.e., RA<0 and
RR<0, for a representative case of absolute risk-aversion with a=3, k=0.1 and zn=0.1), 
see Fig.1); otherwise s/he is both relative and absolute risk-aversive. The important 
point here is that when the cell response is efficiently coupled to the ligand-receptor 
complex (i.e., a<1), a subject always has risk-aversion (i.e., both RA and RR are positive
for all z>0), indicating that pathological gambling and risk-taking behavior observed in 
addicts may be associated with inefficient neural response to dopaminergic stimulation.
Conclusions and implications for neuroeconomics and econophysics
This is the first theoretical investigation into risk attitudes derived from the 
utility model based on neurotransmitter receptor theory (the BCN model). Our results 
suggest that Arrow's original hypotheses (i.e., DARA and IRRA) and the assumption of 
standard economic theory (i.e., risk-aversion) are always true when neuronal response to 
the effect of neurotransmitter-receptor complex formation is efficient; in other words, 
irrational risk-taking behavior may be due to inefficiency of coupling between stimulus 
(i.e., receptor activation) and neural response in dopaminergic neural circuits.
A recent neuroeconomic study reported the dopaminergic neural correlates of 
dependency of risk attitudes on individual financial status [14]. Future neuroeconomic 
studies should examine biophysical mechanisms of risk aversion based on the present 
framework. The present theory predicts that the agonist/antagonist of dopamine 
receptors modify subject’s risk attitude, which can psychopharmacologically be tested. 
Behavioral ecological studies reported that when the resources (reinforcers) are
insufficient, a subject becomes risk-seeking [18]. Neuropsychopharmacological studies 
have also reported that when heroin addicts are under the condition that they do not 
have enough heroins, they tend to prefer uncertain rewards (i.e., heroin) [19]. These 
findings cannot be accounted for by standard microeconomics. In contrast, these 
findings may be explained in the present model by setting a>1 (inefficient neural 
coupling), because in this case, the risk aversion is negative (i.e., risk-seeking) for small 
z. It may be interesting to examine how a deprivation of dopaminergic drugs which a 
subject is addicted to increases parameter a (make the coupling more inefficient), which 
may result in IARA at the cellular and molecular levels. Thus, future 
neuropsychopharmacological studies should examine how intake of addictive 
dopaminergic drug changes parameters a and k in the neurotransmitter receptor 
theory-based utility function and associated risk attitude parameters, in order to better 
understand neuro-biophysical mechanisms of risk-taking behavior observed in 
substance abusers.
Behavioral economic studies have reported that subjects' perception of 
probabilities of outcomes ("decision weight") is distorted; i.e., small probabilities are 
overweighted and large probabilities are underweighted [4,6]. Tellingly, a recent 
behavioral economic study has examined the effect of the distortion of probability 
perception on the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion parameter [21]. Furthermore, a recent study 
observed financial risk-taking in the real-world stock market is modulated by 
testosterone [22]. Therefore, future biophysical studies on risk aversion should 
incorporate the effect of the decision weight and effects of neuroactive hormones on the 
activity of dopamine neurons into the BCN model-derived risk attitudes.
Appendix:
∂RA/∂z=0 has the real and positive solution in terms of z (with the constraint of z>0) 
only for a>1:
.
We can see that ∂RA/∂z <0 for all z>0 in case of a<1 (because ∂2RA/∂z2=0 does not have 
a real solution z for a<1), indicating that DARA for the case of efficient coupling 
between dopamine receptor activation (stimulus) and neuronal response (i.e., a<1). This 
case (a<1) is consistent with Arrow's hypothesis that wealthier people tend to be less 
risk-aversive than poorer people [3]. Likewise, for the linear coupling case (a=1), 
∂RA/∂z <0 for all z, again indicating DARA. For the inefficient coupling case (a>1), in 
contrast to the case of a≤1, both RA=0 and RR=0 have the positive solution in terms of z:
zn= (a-1)k/2 (>0)
(at this point, subjects are absolute and relative risk-neutral). Note that zi>zn. Taken 
together, it is concluded that, in case of a>1 (inefficient coupling), (i) a subject has 
IARA (∂RA/∂z>0) for 0<z<zi and DARA (∂RA/∂z<0) for zi<z, and (ii) for z<zn (<zi), a 
subject's risk attitude is absolute and relative risk-seeking; and at z=zn, s/he is absolute 
and relative risk-neutral, (for a representative case of absolute risk-aversion with a=3, 
k=0.1, see Fig.3, in this case, zn=0.1 and zi= 0.241). It is to be noticed that when a≤1, a 
subject is never absolute or relative risk-seeking for any z>0 (non-negative risk aversion 
for efficient coupling).
zi =                           >0 (for a>1)
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Fig. 1 Absolute risk preference at small reward size for a >1 (inefficient coupling 
between dopaminergic stimulus and neural response). Note that negative risk 
aversion indicates risk preference.
